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Abstract 
This study examines the earnings management behavior of outgoing and incoming 
CEOs. The Jones Model is used to hypotheses that outgoing CEOs do not engage in 
significant earnings management before resignation, and incoming CEOs manage 
earnings downwards in the quarter in which they are appointed as CEO and manipulate 
earnings upwards in the following quarter. The empirical evidence is consistent with 
my hypotheses. My findings on outgoing CEOs are not consistent with Pourciau (1992) 
and further tests suggest that the contradictory results are due mainly to the inherent 
bias in Pourciau’s research methodology. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
There has been intense interest in the management of earnings by managers/firms, 
especially after the accounting frauds committed by Enron and WorldCom were 
uncovered. Academic research exploring the issue has examined the circumstances 
under which managers/firms are expected to manipulate earnings and the direction of 
the manipulation under each circumstance, while employing increasingly reliable 
earnings management detection models.  
 
One of the circumstances under which earnings management is expected to occur is 
when there is a change in the CEO. Earnings management largely involves shifting 
earnings in future periods to the current period (borrowing earnings from the future) or 
deferring current earnings to future periods. Earnings management upward (downward) 
in one period, therefore, eventually will be offset by earnings decreases (increases) in 
the future. Thus, not every CEO has incentives to manage earnings in a particular 
direction in every quarter. Departing CEOs are a special type of CEOs, however. They 
are not expected to continue to hold their position long into the future, and therefore 
have nothing to lose in the future if they borrow earnings from the future by 
accelerating the recognition of earnings. Newly appointed CEOs may have incentives 
to manage earnings in a different direction. Since they are “new kids in town”, they 
probably will not be blamed for any short-term earnings weakness (“it’s the old CEO’s 
fault”). New CEOs therefore are expected to manipulate earnings downward right after 
their appointment, and manipulate earnings upward later to claim credit for an earnings 
turnaround.  
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CEO turnover can be classified either as routine (retirement) or non-routine 
(resignation). This paper examines earnings management behavior before and after 
non-routine CEO turnover. While many studies have investigated earnings 
management associated with CEO turnover in general, very little is known about how 
firms manage earnings in periods before and after a CEO resignation. The only study 
that we are aware of is one by Pourciau (1992), which was published more than a 
decade ago. Her test results suggest that resigning CEOs take less accounting accruals 
and manage earnings downward before their departures. Pourciau herself finds the 
results surprising and perplexing, and surmises that they may be attributed to resigning 
CEOs having to report lower earnings in the year before their departure as a result of 
their manipulating income upward (in such a subtle way to avoid detection) in the 
preceding years. While that explanation is not entirely impla usible, one must question 
why the outgoing CEOs are so good at manipulating earnings upward in prior years 
only to suddenly lose their skill at doing so in the year preceding their resignation.  
 
Since Pourciau’s study was conducted a long time ago and she could not avail herself 
of more sophisticated methodologies used in today’s detecting earnings management, 
her surprising test results could have been explained by flaws in her test design. 
Specifically, Pourciau (1992) detected earning management using the amount of total 
accruals (earnings minus operating cash flow). There are several problems with such 
approach: (1) failure to control for non-discretionary accruals; (2) failure to control for 
poor corporate performance, which usually precedes CEO resignations; (3) failure to 
control for assets write-offs/ write -downs, which are likely to be associated with poor 
performance but may be not discretionary. In addition, the sample size in her study 
was also relatively small.  
Chapter One                                                                                                   Introduction  
- 3 - 
 
In my study, I look for signs of earnings management in each quarter, employing a 
variety of models commonly used to estimate discretionary accruals, including the 
Jones model (1991) and refined Jones model. I find evidence that incoming CEOs 
manipulate earnings downward in the quarter in which they are appointed and manage 
earnings upward in the following quarter. Unlike Pourciau (1992), however, I find no 
evidence that resigning CEOs manipulate earnings in the four-quarter period before the 
date of resignation, either downward or upward. More importantly, I am able to 
replicate Pouciau’s surprising results by adopting her test design for my study. This is 
evidence that her results were primarily caused by flaws in her test design.  
 
My study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, Pourciau’s (1992) finding 
that resigning CEOs manipulate earnings downward in the periods just before their 
departure is puzzling. My study reexamines this issue using more sophisticated 
methodology. The evidence from my study shows that these CEOs have no reasons to 
manipulate earnings downward in those periods to their own detriment. My study 
shows that it is very important for researchers to employ sophisticated models to detect 
earning management. Second, my study also examines the earnings management of the 
incoming CEO and finds that incoming CEOs manipulate earnings downward and 
upward in different periods after the departure of the old CEOs. This suggests that 
boards of directors should be alert to earnings manipulation in those periods. 
 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: Chapter two presents an overview 
of the issue of earnings management and reviews the literature. Chapter three identifies 
several methodological deficiencies in prior research on earnings management by 
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resigning and incoming CEOs, and develops the research hypotheses. Details of the 
empirical test, such as the data sources, sample selection procedure and research 
methodology, are presented in Chapter four. Chapter five reports and interprets the 
empirical test results. Finally, I summarize the findings of the study, discuss the 
implications of the results and suggest areas for future research in Chapter six.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction  
What is earnings management? What are the motivations for earnings management? 
What are the most developed research models in this field? This part of the thesis 
attempts to provide the answers. 
 
2.2 Definitions of Earnings Management 
Although much research has been done in the area of earnings management, 
researchers find it is difficult to give a very clear definition of earnings management. 
The followings are several definitions given in the academic literature: 
 
 “…  a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the 
intent of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to, say, merely facilitating the neutral 
operation of the process)…”  Schipper (1989) (Page 95) 
 
 “Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and 
in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company, or to influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” Healy and Wahlen 
(1999) (Page 104) 
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 “These statements imply that within -GAAP choices can be considered to be earnings 
management if they are used to “obscure” or “mask” true economic performance, 
bringing us again back to managerial intent.” Dechow and Skinner (2000) (Page 67)  
 
Although researchers have different definitions of earnings management, they are 
consistent in at least two aspects. First, the objective of earnings management is to 
mislead the stakeholders and to “obscure” the true economic performance of the firm. 
Second, managers can get benefits from earnings management. For example, managers 
can boost stock price, increase earnings-based bonus awards and avoid regulation by 
means of earnings management. I will discuss these motivations of earnings 
management in detail below.  
 
2.3 Motivations for Earnings Management 
The motivations for earnings management are very important to researchers in this 
field. Only with a good understanding of the motivations for earnings management, 
can researchers hypothesize circumstances under which managers are most likely to 
manipulate accounting numbers, thus do their studies accordingly.  
 
According to prior research, there are at least three kinds of motivations for earnings 
management, including: (1) capital market motivation; (2) compensation (bonus) 
motivation; and (3) anti-regulation motivation. To characterize the recent earnings 
management research, a search of the academy journals in the 1993-2000 period was 
conducted in The Accounting Review, Contemporary Accounting Research, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, Journal of Accounting Research, and Journal of 
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Business, Finance and Accounting. The search identified 47 articles examining 
earnings management based on one of the three motivations. The statistics are reported 
in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Frequency distribution of published papers exploring different 
motivations of Earnings Management 
 
Motivations for earnings management Number of articles % 
Capital market motivation  16 34.0 
Personal bonus award motivation 14 29.8 
Anti-regulation motivation 17 36.2 
Total  47 100.0 
 
Notes: A search of The Accounting Review, Contemporary Accounting Research, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, Journal of Accounting and 
Public Policy, Journal of Accounting Research, and Journal of Business, Finance and Accounting for 
the period 1993-2000 was conducted. The search identified 47 articles examining earnings management 
based on one of the three motivat ions.   
        
As Table 1 shows, 34 percent of these research studies investigated the capital market 
motivation for earnings management. For example, Erickson and Wang (1999) 
investigated whether acquiring firms attempt to increase their stock price prior  to a 
stock for stock merger in order to reduce the cost of buying the target and found that 
acquiring firms did manage earnings upward in the periods prior to the merger 
agreement. Teoh, Wong and Rao (1998) found evidence that initial public offering 
(IPO) firms, on average, have high positive issue-year earnings and abnormal accruals, 
followed by poor long-run earnings and negative abnormal accruals. They believed 
that the incentives to manage earnings might be especially strong when the firm is 
planning to sell shares to the market. Tech, Welch and Wong (1998) provided evidence 
Chapter Two                                                                                          Literature Review  
 
- 8 - 
that seasoned equity issuers raise reported earnings, by altering discretionary 
accounting accruals, to mislead investors. 
  
29.8 percent of these prior research studies have examined the compensation 
motivation for earnings management. For instance, Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan 
(1995) investigated the extent to which executives manipulate earnings to maximize 
the present value of bonus plan payments and found evidence consistent with the 
hypothesis that managers manipulate earnings downwards when their bonuses are at 
their maximum. In addition to the earnings management by top managers, Guidry, 
Leone and Rock (1999) examined bonus incentives and unexpected accruals at the 
business unit level and found that earnings management is used to increase business 
unit managers’ earnings-based bonus awards.  
 
Finally, 36.2 percent of previous studies focused on the anti-regulation motivation of 
earnings management. Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo (1995) investigated how 
banks altered the timing and magnitude of transactions and accruals to achieve primary 
capital, tax, and earnings goals and satisfy the bank-industry regulatory constraints. 
Key (1997) examined unexpected accruals for firms in the cable television industry at 
the time of Congressional hearings on whether to deregulate the industry. Her evidence 
is consistent with firms in the industry deferring earnings during the period of 
Congressional scrutiny. Han and Wang (1998) tested whe ther oil firms that expected to 
profit from the 1990 Persian Gulf Crisis used accruals to reduce their reported 
quarterly earnings and, thus, political exposure. Their results are consistent with their 
hypothesis.    
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2.4 Development of Research Models 
Besides exploring the motivations for earnings management, another fundamental task 
facing researchers is to build up a reliable model to measure management’s discretion 
over earnings and to detect earnings management. Beginning with Healy (1985), many 
contemporary studies in this field have focused on accounting accruals. Accounting 
accruals are the “summary measure of the timing differences that result from all 
accounting choices” (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Total accruals, which are the 
difference between net income and cash flow from operations, can be divided into the 
discretionary accruals and nondiscretionary accruals. Total accruals are observable, 
while discretionary accruals and nondiscretionary accruals are not. So accounting 
researchers believe tha t the vital issue for testing earnings management is to find a way 
to measure nondiscretionary and discretionary accruals. Three main research methods 
have been developed to measure nondiscretionary and discretionary accruals. They are: 
(1) aggregate accruals method; (2) specific accruals method; and (3) frequency 
distribution method. 
 
The aggregate accrual method identifies discretionary accruals based on the relation 
between total accruals and hypothesized explanatory factors. For example, Healy 
(1985) and DeAngelo (1986) used total accruals and change in total accruals 
respectively, as measures of management’s discretion over earnings. Jones (1991) 
introduced a regression approach to control for nondiscretionary accruals, specifying a 
linear relation between total accruals and change in sales and property, plant and 
equipment. According to the variables used to estimate nondiscretionary accruals, this 
method can be further divided into: (1) the Healy Model; (2) the DeAngelo Model; (3) 
the Jones Model; (4) the Refined Jones Model; and (5) the Kang and Sivaramakrishnan 
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Model. The Jones Model is the most frequently used model by researchers, which 
suggests that the Jones Model is widely accepted as providing an adequate proxy for 
earnings management. 
 
The specific accrual method is another popular approach. It was first developed by 
McNichols and Wilson (1988). Unlike the aggregate accrual method, the specific 
accrual method often focuses on a certain industry in which a specific accrual or a set 
of accruals can reliably reflect discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals. For 
example, McNichols and Wilson (1988) used residual provision for bad debt as the 
discretionary accrual proxy. They estimated the residual provision for bad debt as the 
residual from a regression of the provision for bad debts on the beginning balance of 
the provision, and current & future write -offs. Another example is Beaver and Engel 
(1996), who used the residual allowance for loan losses as the discretionary accrual 
proxy. They estimated the residual allowance for loan losses as the residual from a 
regression of the allowance for loan losses on net charge -offs, loan outstanding, 
nonperforming assets and one -year ahead change in nonperforming assets. Other 
studies using specific accruals are Moyer (1990), Petroni (1992), Beaver and 
McNichols (1998), Penalva (1998), Nelson (2000) and Petroni, Ryan and Wahlen 
(1999). 
 
The frequency distribution method was developed more recently. It assumes that 
nondiscretionary accruals and reported earnings in the absence of earnings 
management should be distributed evenly around a specified benchmark, such as zero, 
prior quarter’s earnings or analysts’ forecast. The frequency distribution method then 
examines the statistical properties of reported earnings and identifies whether 
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discontinuities around the benchmark, which suggest the exercise of discretion, exist. 
Studies using the frequency distribution method are by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) 
and Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999).  
 
2.5 Earnings Management Associated with CEO Turnover 
2.5.1 CEOs’ Incentives and Methods to Manipulate Earnings  
CEOs’ compensation contracts normally contain incentive provisions that link CEOs’ 
compensation to firms’ accounting-earnings performance. Therefore, researchers 
predict that the usage of these compensation contracts will induce CEOs to engage in 
earnings management to boost their salary and bonus. Prior studies have found 
empirical evidences consistent with these predictions. For example, Healy, Kang and 
Palepu (1987) examined the effect of accounting procedure changes on cash salary and 
bonus compensation to CEOs and obtained some indirect evidence. They found the 
salary and bonus payments to CEOs were dependent on reported earnings, rather than 
on those “true” earnings that are “uncontaminated”.   
 
According to prior studies, CEOs generally manipulate accounting earnings by 
discretionary accruals. They normally shift earnings in future periods to the current 
period (borrowing earnings from the future) or defer current earnings to future periods. 
To maximize the present value of their cumulative salaries and bonuses, CEOs may 
choose accounting discretionary accruals to balance the short-term and long-term 
benefits. Previous studies have provided evidence consistent with this. For instance, 
Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan (1995) investigated the extent to which executives 
manipulate earnings to maximize the present value of bonus plan payments and found 
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evidences consistent with the hypothesis that executives manipulate earnings 
downwards when their bonuses are at their maximum.  
 
2.5.2 Earnings Management Associated with CEO Turnover 
Since CEOs generally manage earnings by moving accounting numbers from one 
period to another period, researchers are very interested in how CEOs behave just 
before their departing the post of CEO and just after their assuming the post of CEO. 
The short horizon of CEOs’ departure provides researchers a good opportunity to 
examine CEOs’ earning management incentives.  
 
Explanations of Earnings Management Associated with CEO Turnover 
Three main explanations of earnings management associated with CEO turnover that 
have been examined in prior studies are:  
 
(1) Horizon problem. The horizon problem suggests that outgoing CEOs approaching a 
known departure date use accounting discretion to increase earnings and earnings-
based compensation in their final years, at the expense of future earnings. 
 
Since maximizing the present value of their cumulative salaries and bonuses is the goal 
of the CEOs, researchers expect executives who put less value on future earnings than 
current earnings to have stronger incentives to improve short -term earnings 
performance. Typical executives who may place little value on future earnings are 
those who are expecting to leave their positions in the near future. Therefore, CEOs are 
most likely to manage earnings for short-term gains before they depart. Several 
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previous studies have focused on earnings management associated with CEO turnover. 
Dechow and Sloan (1991) investigated the hypothesis that CEOs in their final years of 
office manage discretionary investment expenditures to improve short-term earnings 
performance. They found evidence that CEOs spent less on R&D during their final 
years in office. 
 
(2) Cover-up. Outgoing CEOs in firms with poor performance are threatened by 
termination, thus use accounting discretion to cover up the firm’s deteriorating 
economic performance. 
 
Weisbach (1988) suggested that the dominance of the board of directors by insiders 
might reduce the threat of CEO dismissal associated with poor reported earnings. 
Therefore, the composition of the board may influence the CEO’s incentives to 
manage earnings. 
 
(3)  Big-bath. Incoming CEOs use accounting discretion to boost future earnings at the 
expense of transition-year earnings by writing off unwanted operations and 
unprofitable divisions. 
 
Weisbach (1992) examined the relation between management turnover and divestitures 
of recently acquired divisions. The empirical results indicated that the move to income-
reducing accounting methods, the write-off of unwanted operations and the write-off 
of unprofitable divisions can be attributed to incoming CEOs who implicitly blame 
their predecessors for past performance. 
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Classification of CEO Turnover and Earnings Management 
While many studies have investigated earnings management associated with CEO 
turnover in general, very little is known about how firms manage earnings in periods 
before and after a CEO resignation. The only study that we are aware of, which 
focuses on CEO resignation, is done by Pourciau (1992).  It was published more than a 
decade ago.  
 
Pourciau (1992) classified CEO turnover as routine and nonroutine and examined 
evidence of earnings management associated with “nonroutine” executive changes. 
Her results are consistent with the hypothesis that incoming executives manage 
accruals in a way that decreases earnings in the year of the executive change and 
increases earnings in the following years.  However, she failed to find evidence to 
support her hypothesis that outgoing executives manage accruals upward before their 
departure. On the contrary, her evidence indicated that outgoing CEOs manage 
earnings downward. One suggested reason is that the executive had successfully 
managed earnings, avoid ing termination for a number of years. 
 
Besides Pourciau’s paper, Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) also examined earnings 
management associated with routine and nonroutine CEO turnover. However, they 
found no obvious earnings management. They documented the behavior of a variety of 
financial variables surrounding CEO departures and concluded that turnover-related 
changes in R&D, advertising, capital expenditures, and accounting accruals are mostly 
due to poor performance. They also found the managerial discretion appears to be 
limited to firms whose poor performance precedes the CEO’s departure. They found 
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no evidence of managerial discretion in strongly performing firms where the CEO 
retires as part of the normal succession process. 
 
Earning Management Or Poor Performances 
Murphy and Zimmerman’s (1993) paper raised another issue regarding earnings 
management associated with CEO turnover: Are the unexpected accruals documented 
in prior studies indicative of CEOs’ earnings management, or just the results of poor 
corporate performance?  
 
Prior researchers found CEO turnover often coincides with poor performance of firms. 
For example, Weisbach (1988) and Warner et al. (1988) documented that CEO 
turnover is preceded by adverse share-price and earnings performance. These studies 
indicate that CEO turnover is associated with poor performance of firms. 
 
The systematic poor performance preceding CEO changes confounds the interpretation 
of tests of earnings management in two respects: (1) poor performance preceding CEO 
replacement is likely to disguise attempts by the outgoing CEOs to boost earnings; and 
(2) the “big bath” associated with incoming CEO may represent a correction for the 
earnings boost by the former CEO or reflect a further deterioration in firm performance, 
rather than opportunistic behavior of the new CEO. These possibilities make it difficult 
to interpret the results as evidence of earnings management by outgoing and incoming 
CEOs. 
 
Therefore, to investigate earnings management associated with CEO turnover, one 
fundamental task is to control for performance preceding CEOs’ departure. Prior 
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researchers have acknowledged this point and tried to control for poor performance. 
One well-known study that did so is Murphy and Zimmerman’s (1993). 
 
In their paper, Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) tried to control for the poor 
performance of firms in two ways: 
 
(1) Unlike prior studies, which typically focused on a single financial variable, Murphy 
and Zimmerman’s (1993) study examined eight financial variables jointly (research 
and development, advertising, capital expenditures, accounting accruals, earnings, 
sales, assets, and stock prices). Some of the variables (such as, R&D, advertising, 
capital expenditures, and accounting accruals) were assumed to be subject to 
considerable managerial discretion, while others (such as sales, assets and stock-price 
performance) were assumed to be less discretionary and to reflect largely the 
performance of the firm. They then documented the behavior of these financial 
variables and considered the implications of simultaneous changes among the variables. 
Their findings indicate that the changes in R&D, advertising, capital expenditures, and 
accounting accruals surrounding CEO turnover are due mostly to poor performance, 
not management’s discretion over accruals. 
 
(2) Contrary to the prior studies’ assumption regarding the exogeneity of CEO 
turnover, this study allowed for endogenous CEO departures by using a system of 
simultaneous equations. To reduce the heteroscedasticity in the simultaneous system, 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) were used. The 
empirical results suggest that, after controlling for firm performance and the 
endogeneity of CEO turnover, there is little evidence that CEOs use accruals to 
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manage earnings around their departure date. In addition, the authors segmented the 
sample into subsamples in which departures were unrelated to performance, and 
concluded that managerial discretion is limited to performance-related CEO departures. 
 
2.6 Concluding Remarks  
In summary, prior research studies have devoted considerable efforts to earnings 
management. Their research has defined the concepts of earnings management, 
explored the different motivations of earnings management and developed models to 
detect earnings management. Among all the available models, the Jones Model has 
been the most frequently used.  
 
Very few studies have investigated earnings management associated with CEO 
turnover, and even fewer have classified CEO turnover and conducted the fur ther study. 
This relative blank field give us incentives to do some research in deep.  
Chapter Three                                                                            Hypothesis Development 
  
- 18- 
Chapter Three: Hypothesis Development 
3.1 Limitations of Prior Research 
While many studies have investigated earnings management associated with CEO 
turnover, few have examined specifically earnings management before and after CEO 
resignations. In a study by Pourciau (1992), CEO resignations are divided into two 
groups: forced resignations and voluntary resignations. The author hypothesizes that 
both groups of outgoing CEOs will manipulate reported earnings upwards before their 
resignations to increase their compensation prior to departure. She argued that while 
CEOs who resign voluntarily are in full control of the timing of their resignations, 
CEOs who are forced to resign are aware of their departure, and therefore manage 
earnings upwards in a bid to change the probability or timing of the forced resignations. 
The empirical results, however, seem to suggest that what transpires before CEO 
resignations is the exact opposite of what is expected. Not only does Pourciau (1992) 
fail to find evidence that more accounting accruals are taken in the year preceding 
CEO resignations, but accounting accruals in that period seem to be manipulated 
downward.  
 
Pourciau (1992) herself finds the results surprising and perplexing. She surmises that 
they may be caused by outgoing CEOs having to take less accounting accruals in the 
year before their departure as a result of their manipulating income upward (in such a 
subtle way to avoid detection) in the preceding years. While that explanation is not 
entirely implausible, it is unclear why the outgoing CEOs are so good at manipulating 
earnings upward in prior years only to suddenly lose their skill at doing so in the year 
preceding their resignations. The explanations for the surprising results, I believe, lie 
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elsewhere. Specifically, I have identified several methodological deficiencies in the 
Pourciau (1992) study and they are as follows: 
 
(1) Failure to control for non-discretionary accruals. In her paper, Pourciau simply 
assumed a “random walk process” for earnings, accruals and cash flows to control for 
nondiscretionary accruals. As previously mentioned, this is the same methodology 
used by DeAngelo (1986). Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) have demonstrated the 
low earnings management detecting power of the DeAngelo model, compared with 
other more complicated models (such as, the Jones model). When Pourciau’s study 
was conducted, there was no well-specified model that can control accurately for non-
discretionary accruals.  
 
(2) Failure to control for poor corporate performance. Acknowledging the importance 
of controlling for corporate performance, Pourciau (1993) attempts to control for poor 
performance prior to CEO resignations by deflating earnings and accruals by 
contemporaneous sales. However this procedure is likely to fail because accruals will 
not change proportionately with sales. When sales go down by x%, accruals are likely 
go down by more than x%. For example, if sales deteriorate by 10%, working capital 
accruals would go down by roughly 10% as well, but depreciation and amortization 
expenses would largely remain the same. As a result, total accruals would decline more 
than 10%. Interestingly, before CEO resignations, sales are usually on the decline. As a 
result, total accruals deflated by sales is likely to show a downward trend before CEO 
resignations. This is exactly what Pourciau (1992) found. The downward trend 
exhibited by accruals deflated by sales would offset the CEO’s manipulation of 
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earnings by taking more accruals, and make such earnings management more difficult 
to detect.  
 
(3) Pourciau (1992) also examined write -offs/ write-downs recorded by firms before 
CEO resignations. However, write -offs/ write-downs are likely to be associated with 
poor performance and have little to do with earnings management.  
 
(4) Pourciau included special items in her study, which may not be the discretionary 
part of accruals. Bernard and Skinner (1996) argued that special items should not 
necessarily be viewed as discretionary. “For example, it is much less likely that gain 
on the sale of a subsidiary or gains and losses from lawsuits are discretionary.” (Page 
319) Pourciau did mention that she also computed the total accruals excluding special 
items. However, choosing sales as the deflator makes her test results difficult to 
interpret. 
 
(5) Small sample size. Pourciau’s total final sample size was only 73.  
 
In addition to the inherent methodological deficiency, an increase in monitoring 
activities before CEO resignation may make it difficult for CEOs to engage in earnings 
management before they are forced to resign or voluntarily do so. Previous studies 
have documented a significant relation between firm performance and the probability 
of executive changes. For instance, Weisbach (1988) found that the probability of 
executive change in a firm that is in the lowest performance decile may range between 
6 and 13 percent, while the probability of an executive change in a top-decile company 
is between 3 and 9 percent. This relation implies that firm performance is a signal for a 
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company to monitor the performance of the CEO and the poorly performing 
companies can expect that they are more likely to have CEO turnover and therefore 
increase their monitoring activities. 
 
3.2 Hypotheses for Earnings Management Before CEO Resignation 
Given the controversial nature of outgoing CEOs’ incentives to manipulate earnings, I 
propose my hypothesis in null form: 
 
H1 (Null Hypothesis): The CEOs who resign do not mana ge earnings upward before 
their resignations. 
 
3.3 Hypotheses for Earnings Management After CEO Resignation 
While it is debatable whether outgoing CEOs have incentives to manipulate earnings 
upward or downward before their resignation, there is no significant disagreement over 
the prediction that the incoming CEOs have incentives to manage earnings downward. 
Vancil (1987) summed up the three critical tasks a new CEO must face: (1) managing 
the expectations; (2) taking ownership of the strategy of the corporation; and (3) 
achieving performance goals to build up confidence. Manage expectations and achieve 
performance goals are therefore crucial to incoming CEOs. It is suggested that the new 
CEOs could try to blame the outgoing CEO for poor performance and manage earnings 
upwards to meet performance goals later. Prior research studies provide support for 
this argument. Strong and Meyer (1987) found that new CEOs are more likely to make 
large discretionary write-offs to draw attention to the inferior decisions of  prior CEOs. 
Pourciau (1992) found that new CEOs manage accruals downwards in the year of the 
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executive change and upwards in the following years. I incorporate prior studies’ 
insights and propose the second hypothesis (in alternative form): 
 
H2: Incoming CEOs manage earnings downward immediately after they are appointed 
and manage earnings upward in the following periods. 
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Chapter Four: Sample Selection and Research Models  
4.1 Sample Selection 
4.1.1 Timeline Surrounding CEO Resignation and Sample Selection 
 
For all sample firms, the quarter during which a CEO resigns is defined as quarter 0 
(Q0). The first quarter preceding quarter 0 is defined as quarter –1 (Q-1) and the first 












A keyword search of the Compustat Executive Compensation database was conducted. 
This search revealed 454 companies that had a CEO retiring, resigning, or passing 
away over the sample period 1998-1999. Of these 454 companies, I identified 179 
companies that had CEO a resigning during the sample period. I then deleted 37 
companies because they were financial institutions and regulated companies. (Prior 









FIGURE 1  
Timeline Surrounding CEO Resignation 
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studies suggest deleting financial institutions and regulated companies from data 
sample.) 
 
I obtain the quarterly accounting data from the Compustat Industrial Quarterly 
database. To be included in my sample, companies must have complete accounting 
data from quarter –20 (5 years before resignation date) to quarter 4 (1 year after 
resignation date). Since some firms failed to meet data availability requirements, the 
selection process resulted in a final sample of 126 firms. Table 2 summarizes the 
sample selection process. 
 
Table 2: Selection of sample of CEO resignation, 1998 -1999 
Criteria Number of Firms 
Total CEO turnover in 1998-1999 454 
Less:  
CEO retiring, passing away and other reasons  (275) 
Financial institutions or regulated companies (37) 
Not complete accounting data (16) 
Final sample for regression analysis  126 
 
Note: A keyword search of Compustat Executive Compensation database was conducted. This search 
revealed 454 companies that had a CEO retiring, resigning, or passing away over the sample period 
1998-1999. Of these 454 companies, I identified 179 companies that had CEO resigning during the 
sample period. Then I deleted 53 companies because they were financial institutions, regulated 
companies or failed to meet data availability requirements. The selection process resulted in a final 
sample of 126 firms. 
 
4.1.2 Descriptive Statistics for The Sample 
Descriptive statistics for the 126 sample firms are presented in Table 3. Table 3 shows 
that sample companies have a fairly wide range of size and performance (panel A) and 
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CEO resignations are roughly evenly divide d between Year 1998 and Year 1999 
(panel B).  
 
Panel C shows that the sample firms represent 36 industries, with the highest 
concentration of firms (13 firms) in the Transportation Equipment Industry (SIC 37), 
followed by the Electronics & Other Electrical Equipment Industry (SIC 36), 
Wholesale Trade -durable Goods Industry (SIC 50) and Chemicals & Allied Products 
Industry (SIC 28). The remaining firms in the sample are relatively evenly distributed 
among the other 32 industries.  
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the sample  
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for revenue, total assets, net income and ROA 
 
 Mean Median Mode Std. dev. Minimum Maximum 
Revenue 668.7 170.1 168.5 1257.2 1.2 11816.0 
Total assets 3122 697 348 8734 3 213277 
Net income 35 7 36 188 -1521 197441 
ROA 0.008 0.013 0.037 0.048 -0.825 0.490 
 
Note: Total assets and net income are all reported in millions of US dollars. ROA is return on assets, 




Panel B: Sample distribution by year 
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Panel C: Sample distribution by industry 
 
       
SIC code Industry Frequency 
13 Oil And Gas Extraction  4 
14 Mining And Quarrying  5 
15 Building Construction  1 
20 Food And Kindred Products  5 
21 Tobacco Products  1 
23 Apparel  4 
25 Furniture And Fixtures  2 
26 Paper And Allied Products  1 
27 Printing, Publishing, And Allied Industries  1 
28 Chemicals And Allied Products  9 
29 Petroleum Refining And Related Industries  1 
31 Leather And Leat her Products  5 
32 Stone, Clay, Glass, And Concrete Products  2 
33 Primary Metal Industries  1 
36 Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment 11 
37 Transportation Equipment  13 
38 Instruments and related products  4 
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries  5 
40 Railroad Transportation  3 
44 Water Transportation  2 
45 Transportation By Air  1 
48 Communications  2 
50 Wholesale Trade-durable Goods  10 
51 Wholesale Trade-non -durable Goods  4 
52 Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supply 3 
55 Automotive Dealers And Gasoline Service Stations  1 
56 Apparel And Accessory Stores  1 
57 Home Furniture, Furnishings, And Equipment Stores  2 
58 Eating And Drinking Places  5 
59 Miscellaneous Retail  3 
70 Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, And Other Lodging Places  2 
73 Business Services  2 
79 Amusement And Recreation Services  1 
80 Health Services  4 
81 Legal Services  1 
87 Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management  4 
Total  126 
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4.2 Research Methodology 
4.2.1 Total Accruals 
In my study, I calculate total accruals as income before extraordinary items minus cash 
flow from operating activities. As mentioned earlier, whether special items are 
discretionary or not is subject to debate. Therefore, I subtract the special items (on an 
after-tax basis) from the total accruals. To adjust it to after-tax basis, I multiply special 
items by 0.6. (Assuming tax rate equal to 0.4) 
 
Total Accruals = Income before Extraordinary Items (Item 8) – Cash Flow From 
Operating Activities (Item 108) – 0.6 Special Items (Ite m 32) 
  
4.2.2 Estimation of Discretionary Accruals 
Estimation of Discretionary Accruals for Individual Sample Firm 
Prior research by Han and Wang (1998) and Erickson and Wang (1999) examined 
discretionary accruals as the residuals of regressions using pooled data. However, this 
procedure ignores the fact that different firms normally have different accrual policies 
and accrual patterns, leading to biased coefficient estimates and standard error 
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where  
itTTAC  is total accruals for firm i in quarter t;  
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itREVD  is the change in revenues for firm i in quarter t; 
itAST  is total assets for firm i in quarter t;  
itPPE  is the gross book value of property, plant and equipment for firm i in quarter t;  
jQ  is a quarter indicator variable set equal to 1 for the quarter j (j=1, ... ,4) of the fiscal 
year and 0 otherwise; 
ite  is the error term for firm i in quarter t. 
 
Like prior studies, changes in revenues and in gross property, plant and equipment are 
used to control for the nondiscretionary components in total accruals. The coefficient 
of itREVD  is expected to be positive because changes in working capital accounts (e.g., 
changes in accounts receivable, changes in inventory, etc.) are part of total accruals 
and are positively related to changes in revenues. The expected sign for itPPE  is 
negative because higher fixed assets are expected to lead to higher depreciation and 
deferred taxes. The quarter indicator variables are used to account for variation in 
accruals across quarters. In this model, I assume that firms do not change their accruals 
policy significantly among different years. Therefore, I do not use year indicator 
variables in this model. 
 
I estimate Equation (1) for each firm in the sample individually, using time-series 
quarterly data from the 25 quarters in six years (from 20 quarters before the quarter 
with CEO resignation to 4 quarters after that quarter). Discretionary accruals for each 
firm-quarter observation are estimated as the difference between reported total accruals 
for the quarter and the fitted va lue of total accruals using coefficients from the 
Equation (1). I then calculate the mean discretionary accruals across firms in every 
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quarter from quarter -4 to quarter 4 to judge whether earnings management has 
occurred.  
 
Estimation of Discretionary Accruals by Pooled Sample 
Following Han and Wang (1998) and Erickson and Wang (1999), I also estimate 
discretionary accruals as the residuals, ite , from the following model, using data pooled 














   (2) 
where  
kY  is a year indicator variable taking the value one for the year k (k=1994, ... ,2000) 
and zero otherwise. 
 
Similar to prior studies, the coefficient for itREVD is expected to be positive and the 
coefficient for itPPE is expected to be negative. The quarter (year) indicator variables 
here are used to account for variation in accruals across quarters (years). Prior 
researchers believe accounting accruals are influenced by the economic conditions at 
different points in time. Therefore, adding the quarter and year indicators to the 
equation can control for the variation across periods and improve the accuracy of the 
estimation. To make my study comparable to prior studies, I incorporate yearly 
dummy variables in the pooled data regressions. I used three quarterly dummy 
variables to account for the variation across four calendar quarters and seven yearly 
dummy variables to account for the variation across eight calendar years (1993-2000). 
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The base quarter and base year are the first calendar quarter and the year 1993, 
respectively. 
 
Testing Earnings Management by Pooled Sample on Aggregate Basis 
To capture outgoing and incoming CEOs’ earnings management, two dummy variables 














   (3) 
where 
1T  is an indicator variable equal to 1 if quarter t is one of the four quarters immediately 
before the resignation quarter, and 0 otherwise. 
 
2T  is an indicator variable equal to 1 if quarter t is one of the four quarters immediately 
after the resignation quarter, and 0 otherwise. 
 
If the outgoing CEOs engage in earnings management before their resignations, the 
coefficient of 1T  is expected to be significantly different from zero. However, if the 
incoming CEOs manage earnings downward immediately after they are appointed and 
manage earnings upward in the following periods, the coefficients of 2T  may not be 
significantly different from zero. (The upward effect and downward effects may cancel 
each other off.) Thus, we test Hypotheses H1 and H2 on a quarterly basis. 
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Testing Earnings Management for Pooled Sample on a Quarterly Basis 
Instead of estimating earnings management on an aggregate basis, the following 
equation is estimated to analyze outgoing and incoming CEO’s earnings management 





















jD  (j= -4 to 4) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if quarter t is one of the four quarters 
immediately before and after the resignation quarter and 0 otherwise. 
 
If the CEOs that resign engage in earnings management upward before their 
resignations, some of the coefficients for 4-D to 1-D are expected to be significantly 
higher than zero. If the incoming CEOs manage earnings downward immediately after 
they are appointed and manage earnings upward in the following periods, some of the 
coefficients for 0D  through 4D  are expected to be significantly lower than zero and 
some higher than zero. 
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Chapter Five: Empirical Results and Discussion 
5.1 Estimation of Discretionary Accruals by Individual Sample Firm 
I estimate Equation (1) for each firm individually and this produces a time series of 
estimated quarterly discretionary accruals for each firm. I then compute the mean of 
estimated discretionary accruals across firms in each quarter. Figure 2 plots the mean 
discretionary accruals from Equation (1) for the quarters before and after a CEO 
resignation, including quarters from Q-4 to Q4. The mean residuals are -0.0168, 
0.0602, -0.0409, 0.0052, -0.1387, 0.0889, -0.0796, -0.0943, -0.0194, for quarters from 
Q-4 to Q4, respectively. The mean residuals suggest that the sample firms do not have 
abnormally high or low unexpected accruals for the quarters before Q0. They also 
suggest that the sample firms had abnormally low discretionary accruals in the quarter 
where resignations occurred and abnormally high discretionary accruals in the quarter 
immediately after the resignation quarter. The statistical significance of the mean 
discretionary accruals in these quarters is presented in Table 4.  
 
FIGURE 2
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Table 4: Mean discretionary accruals for each quarter surrounding resignation 
date  
Quarter MDA Standard Error t-value 
Q-4 -0.0168 0.0209 -0.8044 
Q-3 0.0602 0.0428 1.4055 
Q-2 -0.0409 0.0724 -0.5650 
Q-1 0.0052 0.0087 0.5929 
Q0 -0.1387 0.0837 -1.6569** 
Q1 0.0890 0.0423 2.1010* 
Q2 -0.0796 0.1041 -0.7648 
Q3 -0.0943 0.1229 -0.7674 




MDA refers to Mean Discretionary Accruals.  
 
MDA are the average across firms of the error term for each quarter of the following model estimated 
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where  
itTTAC  is total accruals for firm i in quarter t;  
itREVD  is the change in revenues for firm i in quarter t;  
itAST  is total assets for firm i in quarter t;  
itPPE  is the gross book value of  property, plant and equipment for firm i in quarter t;  
jQ  is a quarter indicator variable set equal to one for the quarter j (j=1, ... ,4) of the fiscal year and zero 
otherwise;  
ite  is the error term for firm i in quarter t. 
* Statistically significant at the 5% level.  
** Statistically significant at the 10% level.  
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Table 4 shows that the mean discretionary accruals for Q0 and Q1 are significantly 
different from zero at the 10% and 5% level, respectively.  These empirical results are 
consistent with my Hypothesis H1 that outgoing CEOs do not engage in significant 
earnings management. They are also consistent with Hypothesis H2 that the incoming 
CEOs manage earnings downward immediately after they are appointed and manage 
earnings upward in the following periods. 
 
As well, I compute the average of each regression coefficient across firms. The results 
are reported in Table 5. The mean coefficient of change in revenues is 1.1490 (t -
statistic = 2.6683) and the mean coefficient for property, plant and equipment is -
0.6673 (t-statistic = -2.5005). The signs for both coefficients are in the predicted 
direction and statistically significant at the 5% level. The quarter indicator variables 
are all negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
The results are not consistent with Pourciau’s findings, since she found negative 
unexpected total accruals before CEO resignation in her paper. Acknowledging the 
importance of controlling for corporate performance, Pourciau attempts to control for 
poor performance prior to CEO resignations by deflating earnings and accruals by 
contemporaneous sales. However, the procedure is likely to fail because accruals will 
not change proportionately with sales. Since sales are likely to go down prior to CEO 
resignations, total accruals deflated by sales are likely to show a downward trend 
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Table 5: Averages of coefficients in firm-specific regressions 
 Mean Coefficients Standard Error t-value 
itAST/1  110.3444 50.5784 2.1816* 
itit ASTREV /D  1.1490 0.4306 2.6683* 
itit ASTPPE /  -0.6673 0.2669 -2.5005* 
Q1 -0.1993 0.0816 -2.4430* 
Q2 -0.4132 0.0470 -8.7873* 
Q3 -0.2955 0.0449 -6.5762* 




Mean coefficients are the average coefficients of each term from the following model estimated for each 
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where 
itTTAC  is total accruals for firm i in quarter t;  
itREVD  is the change in revenues for firm i in quarter t;  
itAST  is total assets for firm i in quarter t;  
itPPE  is the gross book value of  property, plant and equipment for firm i in quarter t;  
jQ  is a quarter indicator variable set equal to one for the quarter j (j=1, ... ,4) of the fiscal year and zero 
otherwise;  
ite  is the error term for firm i in quarter t. 
* Statistically significant at the 5% level.  
 
 
To show the flaw of Pourciau’s research methodology, I calculate the unexpected 
accruals for my sample firms in Q–3, Q–2 and Q-1, following Pourciau’s methodology. 
In her study, Pourciau defined unexpected accruals as the first difference of the total 
accruals, after scaling by contemporary sales. Since Pourciau used median of 
unexpected accruals as the indicator of unexpected accruals in her study, I did the same. 
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The results are reported in Figure 3. The median unexpected accruals using Pourciau’s 
model (i.e., deflated by current sales) are –0.0484, -0.0861 and -0.0465 for Q-3, Q-2, 
and Q-1, respectively. Similar to Pourciau’s study, all the variables are negative. The 
median unexpected accruals using my model (i.e., deflated by current total assets) are 
–0.0026, 0.0007 and 0.0017 for the Q-3, Q-2, Q-1, respectively. They are all around 
zero, and two of them are positive. This comparison indicates that Pourciau’s 
perplexing finding in her paper that outgoing CEOs managed earning downwards 





























Median unexpected accruals by my model
Median unexpected accruals by Pourciau's model
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5.2 Estimation of Discretionary Accruals by Pooled Sample  
My regression using data pooled across firms and quarters generates similar results. I 
estimated Equation (2) by the ordinary least squares (OLS) method and the results are 
reported in Table 6. The coefficient for the change in revenues is 0.0419 (t -statistic = 
2.8293) and the coefficient for the gross book value of property, plant and equipment 
is –0.0349 (t-statistic = -10.3034). The signs of both coefficients are in the predicted 
direction and statistically significant at the 5% level. The quarter indicator for Q4 is 
negative and all other quarter indicators are positive. None of these quarter indicator 
variables is statistically significant at the 5% level. All the year indicator variables are 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level except for the indicator variables 
for year 1994. Since my purpose for using quarter and year dummy variables is to 
control for yearly and quarterly economic variation caused by different business cycles 
and economic conditions in different years and quarters, I do not report the coefficients 
and results of the quarter and year indicator variables in the tables and discussion in the 
remainder of the paper. ( Results for these indicator variables are reported in the 
Appendices.) 
 
Figure 4 plots the mean residuals from Equation (2) for the quarters before and after a 
CEO resignation, including quarters from Q-4 to Q4. The mean residuals are -0.0037, 
0.0030, 0.0002, 0.0034, -0.0101, 0.0114, -0.0009, -0.0001, -0.0028 for quarters from 
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Table 6: Estimation of discretionary accruals by pooled data 
 Coefficients Standard Error t-value 
Intercept -0.0579 0.0071 -8.1625 
itAST/1  0.2284 0.1394 1.6380 
itit ASTREV /D  0.0419 0.0148 2.8293* 






















itTTAC  is total accruals for firm i in quarter t;  
itREVD  is the change in revenu es for firm i in quarter t;  
itAST  is total assets for firm i in quarter t;  
itPPE  is the gross book value of  property, plant and equipment for firm i in quarter t;  
jQ  is a quarter indicator variable set equal to one for the quarter j (j=1, ... ,4) of the fiscal year and zero 
otherwise;  
kY  is a year indicator variable taking the value one for the year k (k=1994, ... ,2000) and zero otherwise; 
ite  is the error term for firm i in quarter t. 
* Statistically significant at the 5% level.  
 
FIGURE 4
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The mean of the residuals from the regression also suggests that there are no 
abnormally high or low unexpected accruals for the quarters before Q0. They also 
suggest that the sample firms have low unexpected accruals in the quarter where 
resignation happens and high unexpected accruals in the quarter immediately after Q0. 
I assess the statistical significance of the unexpected accrual surrounding the 
resignation date on both aggregate and quarterly basis in the following section. 
 
5.2.1 Testing Earnings Management by Pooled Sample on Aggregate Basis 
To test for outgoing and incoming CEOs’ earnings management on an aggregate basis, 
I estimate Equation (3). The results are reported in Table 7. The coefficient for the 
change in revenues is positive and the coefficient for the gross book value of property, 
plant and equipment is negative. They are both significantly different from zero at the 
5% level. The coefficient for 1T  is positive and that for 2T  is negative. Neither is 
statistically significant. These results are consistent with my Hypothesis H1 that 
predicts no earnings management before CEO resignation. The evidence is inconsistent 
with Pourciau’s finding, since she found negative unexpected total accruals before 
CEO resignation.  
 
As I have done with the firm-by-firm regressions, I also compare the median 
discretionary accruals for my pooled sample model and using Pourciau’s model. The 
results are reported in Figure 5. The median unexpected accruals using Pourciau’s 
model are –0.0484, -0.0861 and -0.0465 for Q-3, Q-2 and Q-1, respectively. 
Noticeably, they are all negative, which is similar to what Pourciau found in her paper. 
In contrast, the median unexpected accruals for my pooled sample model are all 
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positive. The difference in results is consistent with the argument that Pourciau’s 
finding is mainly due to limitation in her methodology. 
 
Table 7: Estimatio n of discretionary accruals by pooled data on aggregate basis  
 Coefficients Standard Error t-value 
Intercept -0.0580 0.0071 -8.1442 
itAST/1  0.2294 0.1396 1.6439 
itit ASTREV /D  0.0419 0.0149 2.8100* 
itit ASTPPE /  -0.0349 0.0034 -10.3084* 
1T  0.0008 0.0046 0.1818 






















itTTAC  is total accruals for firm i in quarter t;  
itREVD  is the change in revenues for firm i in quarter t;  
itAST  is total assets for firm i in quarter t;  
itPPE  is the gross book value of  property, plant and equipment for firm i in quarter t;  
jQ  is a quarter indicator variable set equal to one for the quarter j (j=1, ... ,4) of the fiscal year and zero 
otherwise;  
kY  is a year indicator variable taking the value one for the year k (k=1994, ... ,2000) and zero otherwise; 
1T  is an indicator variable with 1 if in the year (namely, form quarter -4 to quarter -1) immediately 
preceding to resignation date and 0 otherwise; 
2T  is an indicator variable with 1 if in the year (namely, form quarter 0 to quarter 4) immediately after 
resignation date and 0 otherwise. 
ite  is the error term for firm i in quarter t. 
* Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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FIGURE 5
Median Unexpected Accruals using my model and Pourciau's 




























Median unexpected accruals by my model
Median unexpected accruals by Pourciau's model
 
 
The fact that I am unable to find earnings management by new CEOs during the one 
year after resignation date may be due to two reasons: (1) there is no earnings 
management occurring during this period; and (2) there is earnings management for 
this period, but the pattern of earnings management for very quarter is different, and 
the upward and downward effects of earnings management for different quarters may 
offset each other. I will next examine earnings management on a quarterly basis. 
 
5.2.2 Testing Earnings Management by Pooled Sample on a Quarterly 
Basis 
To test earning management on a quarterly basis for the  pooled sample, I estimated 
Equation (4). The results are reported in Table 8. The coefficients for the change in 
revenues and the gross book value of property, plant and equipment both have the 
correct sign and are significant at the 5% level. Only the coefficients for 0D  and 1D  
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are statistically significant at the 5% level. Since quarter 0 is the first quarter in which 
the incoming CEOs have the power to manage the financial reports, the significance of 
the coefficients for 0D  and 1D  indicate that the incoming CEOs manipulate earnings 
downward for the first quarter (Q0) in which they have power to manage financial 
reports and manage earnings upwards in the following quarter (Q1). As for Q2, Q3 and 
Q4, I cannot detect significant earnings management in these quarters. Generally, this 
result is consistent with Hypothesis H2 that new CEOs manage earnings downward 
immediately after they are appointed and manage earnings upward in the following 
periods.  
 
Table 8: Estimation of discretionary accruals by pooled data on quarterly basis  
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat 
Intercept -0.0580 0.0071 -8.1510 
itAST/1  0.2302 0.1394 1.6514 
itit ASTREV /D  0.0423 0.0149 2.8424* 
itit ASTPPE /  -0.0349 0.0034 -10.3260* 
4-D  -0.0019 0.0068 -0.2839 
3-D  0.0045 0.0068 0.6637 
2-D  -0.0045 0.0068 -0.6555 
1-D  0.0048 0.0071 0.6843 
0D  -0.0149 0.0071 -2.1040* 
1D  0.0138 0.0068 2.0176* 
2D  -0.0021 0.0068 -0.3147 
3D  -0.0046 0.0069 -0.6740 
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where  
itTTAC  is total accruals for firm i in quarter t;  
itREVD  is the change in revenues for firm i in quarter t;  
itAST  is total assets for firm i in quarter t;  
itPPE  is the gross book value of  property, plant and equipment for firm i in quarter t;  
jQ  is a quarter indicator variable set equal to one for the quarter j (j=1, ... ,4) of the fiscal year and zero 
otherwise;  
kY  is a year indicator variable taking the value one for the year k (k=1994, ... ,2000) and zero otherwise; 
jD  (j=-4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) is an indicator variable with 1 for the quarter j and 0 otherwise; 
ite  is the error term for firm i in quarter t. 
* Statistically significant at the 5% level.  
 
5.3 Additional Evidence 
I also use other models of detecting earnings management to examine whether the 
results are robust to the choice of model. Since my sample firms cover a large number 
of industries, it is not practical to use the Dechow and Sloan Model (Industry Model) 
to calculate average total accruals for different industries and compare them to total 
accruals. Therefore, the alternative testing models that used are: the Healy Model 
(1985), the DeAngelo Model (1986), the Refined Jones Model (1995) and the Kang & 
Sivaramakrishnan Model (1995).  
 
5.3.1 The Healy Model 
Using the Healy Model, I calculate the mean total accruals (deflated by the book value 
of total assets) for the estimation period (quarter –20 to quarter –5) and for the period 
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Table 9: The empirical results of Healy Model 
 
Panel A: The mean total accruals for the estimation period and event period 
 
 
Period Mean total accruals Period Mean total accruals  
Estimation period -0.0351 Q0 -0.0481 
Q-4 -0.0398 Q1 -0.0232 
Q-3 -0.0334 Q2 -0.0363 
Q-2 -0.0403 Q3 -0.0352 




The mean total accruals are deflated by the book value of total assets. 
 
Estimation period is the period from quarter –20 to quarter –5. 
 
Panel B: The tests for differences in means (compared to estimation period) 
 
 
Quarter t-value ANOVA F-value Probability 
Q-4 0.7857 0.6173 0.4321 
Q-3 0.2887 0.0833 0.7728 
Q-2 0.8639 0.7463 0.3877 
Q-1 0.5695 0.3243 0.5690 
Q0 2.1398* 4.5788 0.0324 
Q1 1.9809* 3.9239 0.0476 
Q2 0.1904 0.0363 0.8490 
Q3 0.0045 0.0000 0.9964 




* Statistically significant at the 5% level.  
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The mean total accruals in the estimation period and in every quarter from Q–4 to Q4 
are all negative (Panel A). To investigate whether mean total accruals in the event 
quarters are significantly different from that for the estimation period, I apply the t-test 
and ANOVA F-statistic (Panel B). The results in the Panel B indicate that the mean 
total accruals for Q–4, Q–3, Q–2, Q–1, Q2, Q3, and Q4 are not significantly different 
from the mean total accruals of estimation period. On the other hand, the mean total 
accruals in Q0 and Q1 are both significantly different from the mean total accruals in 
the estimation period at the 5% level. The mean total accruals in Q0 is –0.0481, which 
is significantly lower than mean total accruals in estimation period; the mean total 
accruals for Q1 is –0.0232, which is significantly higher than mean total accruals in the 
estimation period. Therefore, similar to Jones’ model, the Healy Model indicates that 
the new CEOs will manage earnings downward immediately after they take the 
position of CEO and manipulate earnings upward in the following quarter. The Healy 
Model also fails to detect any significant earnings management in Q2, Q3 and Q4.  
 
5.3.2 The DeAngelo Model 
The DeAngelo Model assumes that the average change in nondiscretionary accruals 
from two adjacent periods is approximately zero and tests whether the average value of 
the change in total accruals is significantly negative before an event date. Using this 
model, I calculated the average value of the change of total accruals for the period 
from quarter –4 to quarter 4.  
 
The empirical results are shown in Table 10. As expected, the difference in the mean 
total accruals between Q-1 and Q0 is negative and statistically significant at the 10% 
level. The difference in the mean total accruals between Q0 and Q1 is positive and 
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statistically significant at the 5% level. These results indicate that the sample firms 
have abnormally low total accruals for the quarter in which the outgoing CEOs resign 
and abnormally high total accruals for the second quarter after a CEO resignation. The 
differences in the mean total accruals between other quarters are all insignificantly 
different from zero at the 10% level. These results confirm the findings in prior models 
that there is no earnings management in other quarters except Q0 and Q1. 
 
Table 10: The empirical results for DeAngelo Model 
Period Mean of changes 
in total accruals 
t-value Probability 
Q-3 to Q-4 0.0037 0.5440 0.5872 
Q-2 to Q-3 -0.0046 -0.7345 0.4636 
Q-1 to Q-2 0.0115 1.5206 0.1271 
Q0 to Q-1 -0.0132 -1.8630** 0.0645 
Q1 to Q0 0.0178 2.1638* 0.0320 
Q2 to Q1 -0.0144 -1.5212 0.1302 
Q3 to Q2 0.0041 0.5756 0.5657 
Q4 to Q3 0.0039 0.5310 0.5962 
 
Notes:  
The mean total accruals are deflated by the book value of total assets. 
 
* Statistically significant at the 5% level.  
 
** Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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5.3.3 The Refined Jones Model 
In the Jones Model, revenues are assumed to be an objective measure of a firm’s 
operations before managers’ manipulations. However, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 
(1995) argued that the reported revenues may be not completely exogenous and could 
be affected to some extent by managers. To overcome the limitation of the Jones 
model, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney postulated a refined version of the Jones model. 













10                   (5) 
where 
itRECD  is the change in net receivables for firm i in period t. 
 
In their modified Jones model, the authors assume that it is easier to manipulate 
earnings by using discretion based on credit sales than on cash sales. They also remove 
the change in net receivables from the change of revenues and obtained the net change 
of revenues based on cash sales. They believe the net change in revenues base d on 
cash sales can accurately control for nondiscretionary accruals and “then the estimate 
of earnings management should no longer by biased toward zero in samples where 
earnings management has taken place through the management of revenues”. (Page 
201)  I estimate the Refined Jones Model by individual sample firm and report the 
mean discretionary accruals for these quarters in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 plots the mean discretionary accruals from the Refined Jones Model. The 
mean discretionary accruals are -0.0005, 0.0021, -0.0062, 0.0091, -0.0128, 0.0154, -
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0.0055, -0.0045, 0.0019, in quarters Q-4 through Q4, respectively. The mean of the 
discretionary accrual in Q0 is significantly lower than zero at the 10% level and that in 
Q1 is significantly higher than zero at the 5% level. This result is consistent with what 
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5.3.4 The Kang and Sivaramakrishnan Model 
In the Kang and Sivaramakrishnan Model, net revenues, operating expenses and gross 
book value of property, plant and equipment are used as the control variables for the 













210                              (6) 
where 
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itREV  is the net revenue for firm i in period t; 
itEXP  is the operating expenses (cost of good sold, selling and administrative expenses 
before depreciation, etc) for firm i in period t. 
 
I use the Kang and Sivaramakrishnan model to estimate discretionary accruals by 
individual sample firm and the mean discretionary accruals are shown in Figure 7.  
 
The mean discretionary accruals are -0.0012, -0.0005, -0.0076, 0.0081, -0.0164, 
0.0142, -0.0071, -0.0066, -0.0006, for quarters from Q-4 to Q4, respectively. The mean 
of the discretionary accrual in Q0 is significantly lower than zero at the 5% level and 
that in Q1 is significantly higher than zero at the 10% level. Similar to the other 















Q-4         Q-3          Q-2           Q-1           Q0            Q1           Q2          Q3          

















Chapter Six                                                                             Summary and Conclusions 
  
- 50- 
Chapter Six: Summary and Conclusions  
6.1 Summary of Findings 
This study investigates the earnings management behavior of outgoing CEOs and 
incoming CEOs. A sample of 126 CEO resignations during the period 1998-1999 is 
used. For each firm, I examine discretionary accruals in the four quarters immediately 
before and after the CEO resignation.  
 
The results suggest that outgoing CEOs use accruals to increase earnings one year 
before resignation date on the aggregate basis. The quarterly analysis for the individual 
firms sample shows that outgoing CEOs record accruals to increase earnings in 
quarter -4, quarter –3 and quarter-1. However, all these discretionary accruals are not 
significantly different from zero even at the 10% significance level. Therefore, my 
empirical results support my Hypothesis H1 (Null Hypothesis), which predicts no 
earnings management by outgoing CEOs. Since my results are not consistent with 
Pourciau’s findings, I also calc ulate the unexpected accruals using Pourciau’s 
methodology. My results indicate Pourciau’s findings are due to an inherent bias in her 
methodology. 
  
My empirical results also indicate that incoming CEOs record accruals to decrease 
earnings in quarter 0 and increase earnings in quarter 1. The significance tests show 
that the discretionary accruals for these two quarters are significantly different from 
zero either at the 5% level or the 10% level. These results support my Hypothesis H2 
that incoming CEOs manage earnings downward immediately after they are appointed 
and manage earnings upward in the following periods. 
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6.2 Implication of Findings 
The evidence for earnings management behavior before CEOs’ departure from 
previous studies is controversial. My study shows that outgoing CEOs do not engage 
in significant earnings management one year before resignation. One possible 
explanation is that the increase in monitoring activities before CEO resignation may 
make it difficult for outgoing CEOs to engage in earnings management before they are 
forced to resign or voluntarily do so.  
 
While prior evidence on outgoing CEOs’ earnings management behavior 
iscontroversial, there is no significant disagreement in the prediction of incoming 
CEOs’ earnings management. My study provides additional empirical evidence to 
support the “Big-bath” hypothesis. My results indicate that incoming CEOs will use 
accounting discretion to blame the outgoing CEOs for poor performance and manage 
earnings upwards to meet performance target later. 
 
6.3 Contribution of Study 
Compared with other issues in earnings management, relatively few researchers have 
investigated earnings management associated with CEO turnover. Even fewer 
researchers have focused on earnings management associated with CEO resignation. 
Only Pourciau has investigated earnings management associated with nonroutine CEO 
turnover. However, due to several methodological deficiencies, Pourciau herself found 
some of her results surprising and perplexing. I applied a more reliable methodology in 
my study. My methodological improvements include: (1) using quarterly data instead 
Chapter Six                                                                             Summary and Conclusions 
  
- 52 - 
of yearly data; (2) using the Jones Model to control for nondiscretionary accruals and 
poor corporation performance before CEO resignation; (3) deleting special items from 
total accruals; and (4) increasing total sample size to 126 and a fair variety of 
industries. 
 
My study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, Pourciau’s (1992) finding 
that resigning CEOs manipulate earnings downward in the periods right before their 
departure is puzzling. My study shows that they appear no reason for manipulating 
earnings downward in those periods to their own detriment. Second, I employ more 
sophisticated models to detect earning management. Results from les s sophisticated 
models may be likely to be unreliable and mislead researchers. 
 
6.4 Limitations and Suggestion for Future Research 
One limitation of this study is that I only studied CEOs earnings management behavior 
during the period from four quarters be fore the resignation date to four quarters after 
resignation date.  Future research can prolong the time horizon to better understand 
CEOs’ earnings smoothing behaviors.  
 
The other limitation is that I can only detect new CEOs’ earnings management in the 
resignation quarter and the quarter following resignation quarter. I find no significant 
earnings management behavior in other quarters within one year after resignation date. 
I cannot conclude whether this is due to the fact that new CEOs stop manipulating 
earnings during this period or the inability of my model to detect earnings management, 
if any. Future research can focus on these quarters for fully understanding the pattern 
of new CEOs’ earnings management  
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6.5 Conclusions 
This study examines the earnings management behavior of outgoing and incoming 
CEOs surrounding CEO resignation. The Jones Model is used to test two hypotheses. 
The empirical evidence is consistent with my hypotheses, indicating that outgoing 
CEOs do not engage in significant earnings management before resignation and 
incoming CEOs manage earnings downwards in the quarter in which they are 
appointed as CEO and manipulate earnings upwards in the following quarter. My 
empirical results regarding outgoing CEOs are not consistent with Pourciau’s findings. 
Further analysis indicates that this is mainly due to the inherent bias in Pourciau’s 
research methodology. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Full table of estimation of discretionary accruals by pooled data 
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat 
Intercept -0.0579 0.0071 -8.1625 
itAST/1  0.2284 0.1394 1.6380 
itit ASTREV /D  0.0419 0.0148 2.8293* 
itit ASTPPE /  -0.0349 0.0034 -10.3034* 
Y00 0.0487 0.0075 6.5197* 
Y99 0.0346 0.0073 4.7390* 
Y98 0.0392 0.0073 5.4088* 
Y97 0.0367 0.0072 5.0911* 
Y96 0.0369 0.0072 5.0996* 
Y95 0.0354 0.0075 4.7462* 
Y94 0.0136 0.0078 1.7514** 
Q4 -0.0006 0.0038 -0.1512 
Q3 0.0023 0.0033 0.6859 






















itTTAC  is total accruals for firm i in quarter t;  
itREVD  is the change in revenues for firm i in quarter t;  
itAST  is total assets for f irm i in quarter t;  
itPPE  is the gross book value of  property, plant and equipment for firm i in quarter t;  
jQ  is a quarter indicator variable set equal to one for the quarter j (j=1, ... ,4) of the fiscal year and zero 
otherwise;  
kY  is a year indicator variable taking the value one for the year k (k=1994, ... ,2000) and zero otherwise; 
ite  is the error term for firm i in quarter t. 
* Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 - 56 - 
Appendix 2: Full table of testing Earnings Management by pooled data on aggregate 
basis 
 
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat 
Intercept -0.0580 0.0071 -8.1442 
itAST/1  0.2294 0.1396 1.6439 
itit ASTREV /D  0.0419 0.0149 2.8100* 
itit ASTPPE /  -0.0349 0.0034 -10.3084* 
1T  0.0008 0.0046 0.1818 
2T  -0.0024 0.0044 -0.5379 
Y00 0.0498 0.0077 6.4638* 
Y99 0.0359 0.0079 4.5660* 
Y98 0.0396 0.0077 5.1055* 
Y97 0.0364 0.0073 4.9645* 
Y96 0.0369 0.0072 5.0984* 
Y95 0.0354 0.0075 4.7471* 
Y94 0.0136 0.0078 1.7547** 
Q4 -0.0006 0.0043 -0.1364 
Q3 0.0026 0.0035 0.7477 






















itTTAC  is total accruals for firm i in quarter t;  
itREVD  is the change in revenues for firm i in quarter t;  
itAST  is total assets for firm i in quarter t;  
itPPE  is the gross book value of  property, plant and equipment for firm i in quarter t;  
jQ  is a quarter indicator variable set equal to one for the quarter j (j=1, ... ,4) of the fiscal year and zero 
otherwise;  
kY  is a year indicator variable taking the value one for the year k (k=1994, ... ,2000) and zero otherwise; 
1T  is an indicator variable with 1 if in the year (namely, form quarter -4 to quarter -1) immediately 
preceding to resignation date and 0 otherwise; 
2T  is an indicator variable with 1 if in the year (namely, form quarter 0 to quarter 4) immediately after 
resignation date and 0 otherwise. 
ite  is the error term for firm i in quarter t. 
* Statistically significant at the 5% level.   
** Statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Appendix 3: Full table of testing Earnings Management by pooled data on quarterly 
basis 
 
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat 
Intercept -0.0580 0.0071 -8.1510 
itAST/1  0.2302 0.1394 1.6514 
itit ASTREV /D  0.0423 0.0149 2.8424* 
itit ASTPPE /  -0.0349 0.0034 -10.3260* 
4-D  -0.0019 0.0068 -0.2839 
3-D  0.0045 0.0068 0.6637 
2-D  -0.0045 0.0068 -0.6555 
1-D  0.0048 0.0071 0.6843 
0D  -0.0149 0.0071 -2.1040* 
1D  0.0138 0.0068 2.0176* 
2D  -0.0021 0.0068 -0.3147 
3D  -0.0046 0.0069 -0.6740 
4D  -0.0037 0.0070 -0.5250 
Y00 0.0494 0.0078 6.3709* 
Y99 0.0356 0.0079 4.5185* 
Y98 0.0396 0.0078 5.0827* 
Y97 0.0367 0.0073 5.0009* 
Y96 0.0368 0.0072 5.1038* 
Y95 0.0354 0.0074 4.7511* 
Y94 0.0136 0.0077 1.7527** 
Q4 -0.0006 0.0043 -0.1306 
Q3 0.0022 0.0035 0.6374 


























itTTAC  is total accruals for firm  i in quarter t;  
itREVD  is the change in revenues for firm i in quarter t;  
itAST  is total assets for firm i in quarter t;  
itPPE  is the gross book value of  property, plant and equipment for firm i in quarter t;  
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jQ  is a quarter indicator variable set equal to one for the quarter j (j=1, ... ,4) of the fiscal year and zero 
otherwise;  
kY  is a year indicator variable taking the value one for the year k (k=1994, ... ,2000) and zero otherwise; 
jD  (j=-4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) is an indicator variable with 1 for the quarter j and 0 otherwise; 
ite  is the error term for firm i in quarter t. 
* Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
** Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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